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Abstract 
 
This paper incorporates social psychology into implementation theory. Real 
individuals care not only about their material benefits but also about their social 
influence in terms of obedience and conformity. Using a continuous time horizon, we 
demonstrate a method of manipulating the decision-making process, according to which, 
an uninformed principal utilizes her/his power of social influence to incentivize multiple 
informed agents to make honest announcements. Following this method, we show that 
with incentive compatibility, the principal can implement any alternative as she/he 
wishes as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome, even if her/his power is limited and no 
contractual devices are available. 
 
Keywords: Implementation, Uniqueness, Obedience, Conformity, Small 
Guilt-Aversion, Permissive Results. 
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1. Introduction 
  
This paper investigates a decision problem in which a principal schemes to select 
the alternative that is desirable in light of her/his wishes, although she/he is not aware of 
what this alternative might be. Besides the principal, there exist multiple agents who 
possess their private signals about this potential alternative. The principal therefore 
requires these agents to make announcements to her/him about these private signals. In 
order to put the agents’ announcements to good use in choosing the desired alternative, 
the principal has to come up with various ways to incentivize each agent to reveal any 
information that is honest and useful in light of the principal’s wishes. In this case, it is 
insufficient for their honest announcements to satisfy incentive compatibility, since 
there may also exist self-enforcing,  but dishonest, announcements that prevent the 
principal from arriving at her/his desirable alternative. Hence, in addition to incentive 
compatibility, the principal has to utilize additional incentive devices that function in 
eliminating unwanted equilibria, that is, the principal needs to obtain their honest 
announcements as the unique Nash equilibrium or similar to this. 
The issue of uniqueness has been studied intensively in the standard theory of 
implementation; it was generally assumed that any agent is motivated by her/his 
material benefit and is purely rational; she/he cares only about her/his intrinsic utility 
that is directly derived from the alternative choice, and enjoys full autonomy in making 
her/his announcements. Following these assumptions, the authors in literature pertaining 
to this field have generally confined their attention to inventing new concepts of binding 
contractual devices such as the modulo mechanisms (Maskin [1977/1990], Matsushima 
[1988], Abreu and Sen [1990]) and the Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms (Abreu and   4
Matsushima [1992a, 1992b, 1994]), that implement, at least in the virtual sense, any 
value of the fixed social choice function as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome or 
similar in compensation for artificial tailoring
1. 
In contrast to the standard theory, any real person does care about not only her/his 
material benefit but also about any factor of social influence; she/he often feels guilty 
about disobeying an authority figure’s wishes. This feeling of guilt is especially 
strengthened when she/he expects all members of her/his reference group to obey these 
wishes. In this respect, several experimental studies in social psychology, such as the 
Eichmann test by Milgram (1974), the prison experiment by Zimbardo et al. (1977), and 
the hospital experiment by Hofling (1966), have commonly reported that the subjects in 
laboratories and fields tended to be extremely obedient in the presence of authority 
figures.
2 There also exist experimental studies such as Ash (1955), that report that the 
subjects tended to seek conformity to their reference groups’ modes of behavior.
3 From 
these rich stores of knowledge in social psychology, it is natural to infer that the 
aforementioned principal is thinking pragmatically of utilizing social influence so as to 
change the agents’ announcements.
4 
On the basis of the above arguments, this paper demonstrates the principal’s 
method of implementing the desirable alternative by making full use of her/his limited 
power of social influence. Using the continuous time horizon, the principal will design 
                                                 
1 For the surveys on the standard theory of implementation, see Moore (1992), Palfrey (1992), 
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapter 10), and Maskin and Sjöström (2002). 
2 These experiments assumed that the authority figures’ wishes are not prosocial; the subjects 
may be extremely obedient even if the authority figures disturb social order. 
3  For issues on social influence in general, see also Cialdini (2001). 
4 Attempts to incorporate social psychology into economics are not new but are an area of 
increasing interest. See Akerlof and Dickens (1982), Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti 
(1989), Bernheim (1994), Gneezy (2005), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Bébabou (2007) 
and so on.   5
the decision function that makes the agents’ honest announcements incentive 
compatible, while also manipulating the announcement procedure in the following 
manner. 
(i)  The agents make their initial announcements. 
(ii)  Any agent is permitted to change her/his announcement at any time, and even 
many times, whenever she/he wants. 
(iii)  This procedure is randomly terminated at a constant hazard rate. According to 
the specified decision function, the principal selects the alternative that 
corresponds to their final announcements that are effective at the terminal 
time. 
(iv)  During this procedure, each agent is prohibited from monitoring the other 
agents’ announcements. 
Apart from the decision function, the principal does not use any other contractual device 
that is tailored to the details of the model specification. This implies that the agents’ 
announcements, except for the ones that are effective at the terminal time, do not need 
to be verifiable to the public. 
The result is quite permissive from the principal’s point of view; with the 
assumption of complete information, the agents’ announcing honestly at all times is the 
unique Nash equilibrium. We can replace the Nash equilibrium with other 
less-demanding solution concepts and we may extend our model to the incomplete 
information case.   
Our permissive results depend on the psychological assumption of obedience and 
conformity that, at any time, each agent feels guilty about her/his dishonest 
announcement if she/he expects that the other agents have never announced dishonestly.   6
It is of particular importance to point out that our permissive results are almost 
irrelevant to the degree to which each agent feels guilty; even if the principal’s power of 
social influence is too limited to make dishonest agents feel very guilty, she/he can 
considerably control their announcements in her/his own way by manipulating the 
procedure in the above manner. Each agent can lessen the psychological cost just a little 
by waiting for someone else to announce dishonestly before she/he does. This tiny cost 
reduction, along with incentive compatibility and random termination, is sufficient to 
trigger a tail-chasing competition among the agents, eliminating all their dishonest 
announcements at any time in due order. 
The earlier works by Matsushima (2008a, 2008b) took into account behavioral 
aspects of agents in the theory of implementation
5  and showed that the presence of the 
small psychological cost of lying simplifies the method of designing the 
Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms. These works, however, treated the subjects’ behavioral 
motives in a very naïve way. For instance, these works did not take account of any 
aspect of conformity, in that each agent’s psychological cost of lying decreases once 
anyone else has lied. This naïveté is the central reason why the principal in these works 
still needed a contractual device that fines the first liars, which is the heart of the basic 
concept of the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism, in order to trigger their tail-chasing 
competition. In contrast, the principal in this paper can instigate the agents to their 
tail-chasing competition by resorting to their feelings of guilt, without utilizing such à la 
Abreu-Matsushima contractual devices. 
Ash (1955) found in his famous conformity experiment that any subject feels less 
guilty if the other members of her/his peer group are not unanimous in conforming to 
                                                 
5  There are a few other works in the study of implementation that took into account behavioral 
aspects, such as Eliaz (2002) and Glazer and Rubinstein (1998).   7
the collective norms. This finding in social psychology is consistent with our 
conformity assumption. 
We should make a further comment on the differences between the present paper 
and the standard theory of implementation as follows. In the standard theory, the public 
can correctly infer the principal’s wishes from the mechanism, or the procedure; the 
agents who are motivated only by material benefits surely play the associated unique 
Nash equilibrium, whose outcome is set equal to the value of the social choice function, 
that is, her/his desirable alternative. The public can understand her/his wishes just by 
calculating this unique Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, the public in the present 
paper cannot infer the principal’s wishes from the procedure alone. The procedure is 
kept independent of the principal’s wishes, and the agents’ behaviors are influenced by 
the principal’s wishes. Hence, the public cannot calculate their equilibrium behavior as 
long as the public is not informed of her/his wishes in advance. 
The above comment may draw the following pessimistic view: the principal 
generally prefers to utilize her/his power of influence rather than contractual devices, 
when she/he wishes to undertake any action that cannot necessarily win the approval of 
the public. By keeping her/his wishes concealed from the public, but drawing out the 
agents’ tiny feeling of guilt, even dogmatic principals can make their antisocial 
decisions as they wish.   
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 shows the model with 
complete information. Section 3 introduces psychological assumptions on social 
influence. Section 4 defines a solution concept named mutual dominance, which is a 
modification of iterative dominance and a generalization of mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium. Section 5 shows the main theorem that it is the unique behavior consistent   8
with mutual dominance that the agents announce honestly at all times. Section 6 extends 
the model to the incomplete information case.   9
2. The Model 
 
Let  {1,2,..., } Nn ≡  denote the set of agents, where  2 n ≥ . Let  A denote the set 
of alternatives. Let us consider a decision problem with the continuous time horizon 
[0, ) ∞ , in which, a principal makes an alternative choice according to the following 
agents’ announcement procedure, denoted by  ( , , ) M gr Γ ≡ . Let  i M  denote the set of 
messages for each agent  iN ∈ . Let  i iN M M
∈ ≡ ×   denote the set of message profiles. At 
the initial time 0, the principal requires each agent i  to announce any message 
ii mM ∈ . At any time after the initial time 0, and many times, she/he can change her/his 
message. It is assumed that at any time, each agent cannot observe the other agents’ 
announcements, and therefore, cannot make her/his alternative choice contingent on the 
other agents’ past announcements. Based on this assumption, we define a strategy for 
agent  i  as a function  :[0, ) ii sM ∞→ , where  ( ) ii st M ∈  implies the message that 
agent  i  announces at time  t, that is, implies the last message that she/he has changed 
until time  t. We assume that  i s   is right-continuous, that is, for every  0 t > , either 
() () ii st st =    for  all tt ≥   , 
or there exists  tt ′>  such  that 
() ( ) ii st st ′ ≠ , and 
() () ii st st =    for  all  [, ) tt t ′ ∈   . 
Let  i S   denote the set of strategies for agent  i. Let  i iN SS
∈ ≡ ×   denote the set of strategy 
profiles. Let 
\{ } ij jN i SS − ∈ ≡×  for  each iN ∈ . 
The principal randomly terminates this announcement procedure at a constant 
hazard rate  (0, ) r∈∞ . Hence, for every  [0, ) t∈ ∞ , the probability that the   10
announcement procedure terminates at or after any time  t  is given by 
exp( ) rt − . 
When the announcement procedure terminates at any time  t, the principal makes an 
alternative choice on the basis of the message profile  ( ) ( ( )) ii N st s t M ∈ = ∈  that has 
been announced just at this terminal time  t; she/he selects the alternative  ( ( )) gst A ∈  
according to the decision function : gM A → , along with the message profile 
announced at the terminal time. 
Additional accounts for this announcement procedure are as follows. Before the 
initial time 0, the principal explains to each agent her/his wishes for this decision 
problem, such as “I wish to aid the poorest persons.”
6  The principal then requires each 
agent to give as her/his message any relevant information that is unknown to the 
principal, such as the answer to the question of “where the poorest persons live?” Given 
that the agents have announced any message profile mM ∈  at the randomly 
determined terminal time, the principal will regard the corresponding alternative 
() gm A ∈   as being the desirable one in light of her/his wishes. 
For each  iN ∈ , let us fix a message 
*
ii mM ∈  as  the  honest message for agent  i, 
which implies the best answer by agent i in line with the principal’s wishes. Let 
** () ii N mm M ∈ =∈  denote the honest message profile. We define the honest strategy 
*
ii sS ∈  for  agent i by 
** () ii st m =  for  all  0 t ≥ . 
According to 
*
i s , agent  i  announces honestly at all times. Let 
** () ii N ss S ∈ = ∈  denote 
                                                 
6 This paper does not depend on whether the principal’s wishes are prosocial, antisocial, or 
neither. See Footnote 2.   11
the honest strategy profile. 
For every 
* /{ } ii i sSs ∈ , we denote by  ( ) [0, ) ii ts∈ ∞  the first time at which agent 
i announces  dishonestly, where 
   
* (() ) ii i i sts m ≠ , and 
* () ii st m =    for  all  ( ) ii tt s <   . 
For convenience, let us define 
* () ii ts = ∞ . For every  0 t >  and every strategy 
* /{ } ii i sSs ∈  for  agent i, we define another strategy  , it i sS ∈  for  agent i by 
*
, () it i st m =    for  all  [0, ) tt ∈   , and 
, () () it i st s t =     for  all tt ≥   . 
According to  , it s , agent  i announces honestly before time  t, whereas she/he follows 
i s   at or after time  t. 
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3. Obedience and Conformity 
 
We denote by  : i US R →  the payoff function for agent  i, where  ( ) i Us implies 
the payoff for agent  i when she/he follows the strategy  ii sS ∈  and expects the other 
agents to follow the profile of strategies  ii sS − − ∈ . We define a game as a combination 
of the announcement procedure and the profile of the payoff functions  ( ,( ) ) iiN U ∈ Γ . We 
assume that the payoff  ( ) i Us for  agent i  is separated into two parts; 
() () () ii i Us Vs Ws =−. 
The first part  ( ) i Vs is called the material payoff, whereas the second part  ( ) i Ws is 
called the psychological cost. The material payoff  ( ) i Vs  implies the expected value of 
the intrinsic utility  ( ) i va R ∈  that is derived directly from the alternative choice, that 
is, 
0
( ) ( ( ( ))) [1 exp( )] ii
t
Vs vgs t d r t
∞
=
≡− − ∫ . 
We introduce an assumption on  ( ) i va, which implies incentive compatibility in terms 
of intrinsic utilities derived directly from the alternative choices, as follows. 
 
Assumption 1: For every  iN ∈ , 
(1)    
** (( ) ) (( / ) ) ii i vg m vg m m ≥  for  all  ii mM ∈ . 
 
Assumption 1 implies that each agent can maximize her/his intrinsic utility derived 
directly from the alternative choice by announcing honestly, provided the other agents 
announce honestly. Clearly from Assumption 1, for every  iN ∈ , 
(2)    
** () (/) ii i Vs Vs s ≥  for  all  ii sS ∈ ,   13
which implies incentive compatibility in terms of material payoffs, where each agent can 
maximize her/his material utility by announcing honestly at all times, provided she/he 
expects the other agents to announce honestly at all times. 
  In addition to the impact of the alternative choices on her/his material payoff 
() i Vs, each agent cares about social influences, such as obedience to the principal’s 
wishes, and conformity to the other agents’ mode of behavior, which determine her/his 
psychological cost  ( ) i Ws. Let us introduce two assumptions on  ( ) i Ws as  follows. 
 
Assumption 2: For every  iN ∈ , 
(3)    
** () (/) ii i Ws Ws s <  for  all 
* \{ } iii sSs ∈ . 
 
Assumption 2 implies that whenever each agent expects the other agents to 
announce honestly at all times, then she/he feels guilty about her/his dishonest 
announcements. In this case, she/he can save her/his psychological cost by announcing 
honestly at all times. It is, however, implicit in Assumption 2 that the degree to which 
each agent  i  can save her/his psychological cost is very limited. 
 
Assumption 3: For every  iN ∈ , every  \{} j Ni ∈ , and every  sS ∈ , if 
    () jj ts<∞, and 
() () () ii j j hh ts ts ts ≤≤ for  all  \{, } hNi j ∈ , 
then 




lim exp( ( ))









>− ,   14
where 
2 (,)
max | ( ) ( ) | ii i
aa A
Lv a v a
′ ∈
′ ≡−  denotes the upper bound of differences in intrinsic 
utilities for agent  i. 
 
Assumption 3 implies that at any time, each agent’s psychological cost of 
announcing dishonestly is smaller if she/he expects that there exists another agent who 
has already announced dishonestly. Hence, any agent can save her/his psychological 
cost by waiting for any other agent to announce dishonestly earlier than she/he, that is, 
by  avoiding being one of the first persons to announce dishonestly. Note that in 
Assumption 3, agent i is one of the first persons to announce dishonestly, whereas 
agent  j   is one of the first persons except for agent  i  to announce dishonestly. In this 
case, by deferring the first time to announce dishonestly from time  ( ) ii ts to time 
() jj ts ε + , agent  i can avoid being one of the first persons to announce dishonestly 
and save her/his psychological cost at least by 
exp( ( )) ij j Lr rt s ε − , 
where  0 ε >  is chosen close to zero. Assumption 3 implies that even if each agent 
expects the other agents to announce dishonesty at all times, she/he feels guilty about 
her/his dishonest announcements; irrespective of whether the other agents’ strategies are 
honest or not, she/he can save her/his psychological cost by announcing honestly for the 
first very short time interval [0, ) ε . It is, however, implicit in Assumption 3 that the 
degree to which each agent  i  can save her/his psychological cost is very limited.
7 
 
                                                 
7 We must note that the notation  i s−  in agent  ' is  psychological cost  (, ) ii i Wss −  implies, 
not the profile of strategies that the other agents actually play, but the profile of strategies that 
agent  i   expects the other agents to play.   15
Example 1: Let us consider a special case in which each agent  ' is  psychological  cost 
is defined as the expected value of her/his experienced psychological disutility, that is, 
0
( ) ( ; ) [1 exp( )] ii
t
Ws ws t d r t
∞
=
≡− − ∫ , 
where agent i   experiences her/his psychological disutility  ( , ) i ws t  when  the 
announcement procedure terminates at time t . It was assumed that  ( , ) i ws t is 
independent of  ( ) st ′  for all tt ′> . In this case, Assumption 3 is replaced by the 
following inequalities; for every iN ∈ , every  \{} j Ni ∈ , every sS ∈ , and every 
0 t ≥ , if 
    () jj ts t ≤ , and 






jj ii i t s
i









Example 2: Following Example 1, let us specify  ( , ) i ws t by 















   if  ( ) ( ) ii hh ts ts ≤  for  all hN ∈ , 
and 















    otherwise, 
where  0 λ > ,  0 ε > , and the function  : {0,1} ii M ι →   is defined by 
* ()1 ii m ι = , and 
()0 ii m ι =  for  all 










 implies the proportion of the time length that agent i 
announces dishonestly when the announcement procedure terminates at time  t. It is 
clear that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold in this example. This specification implies 
   
2 (,)
max ( ) ( ) i
ss S
Ws Ws λ ε
′ ∈
′ −≤ + . 
Hence, by letting  0 λ >  and  0 ε >  get close to zero, we can make each agent’s 
psychological cost as negligible as possible without harming Assumptions 2 and 3.   17
4. Mutual Dominance 
 
We introduce a solution concept named mutual dominance, which is regarded as a 
generalization of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, and also regarded as a minor 
modification of iterative dominance, as follows. We denote by  ii SS ⊂    a subset of 
strategies for agent  i. Let us denote  i iN SS
∈ ≡ ×     and 
\{ } ij jN i SS − ∈ ≡×     for all iN ∈ . For 
convenience, let us confine our attention to any subset of strategy profiles  S    satisfying 
a minimal requirement of compactness in the sense that either 
* {} ii Ss =    for  all iN ∈ , 
or there exist  iN ∈  and  ii sS ∈    such  that 
() () ii j j ts ts ≤  for  all  j N ∈  and  all  jj sS ∈   . 
A subset of strategy profiles  SS ⊂    is said to be mutually undominated in the game 
(, ( ) ) iiN U ∈ Γ   if there exist no  iN ∈ ,  ii sS ∈   , and  ii sS ′∈  such  that 
(, ) (, ) ii i ii i Uss Uss −− ′ >  for  all  ii sS − − ∈   . 
Mutual dominance implies that any strategy for each agent  i in  i S     is undominated as 
long as the other agents follow any profile of their strategies in  i S−   . 
Mutual dominance is related to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium as follows. A 
mixed strategy for each agent  i is defined as a simple lottery  : [0,1] i S α →  on  i S , 






= ∑ . Let  i Λ  denote the set of 
mixed strategies for agent  i. Let  i iN ∈ Λ ≡×Λ denote the set of mixed strategy profiles.   18
A mixed strategy profile  ( ) iiN α α ∈ ≡∈ Λ  is said to be a Nash equilibrium in the game 
(, ( ) ) iiN U ∈ Γ  if 
() (, ) ii i i UU α αα − ′ ≥  for  all iN ∈  and  all  ii α′∈Λ , 
where we define  ( ) () () ii i
sS iN
UU s s α α
∈∈
≡ ∑∏. It is clear that if a mixed strategy profile 
α ∈Λ  is a Nash equilibrium and  i S     is equivalent to the support of  i α  for  all iN ∈ , 
then  S    is mutually undominated. It is also clear that if  S    is mutually undominated 
and  {} ii Ss =    for  all  iN ∈ , then  () iiN ss ∈ =   must be a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. 
Mutual dominance is related to iterative dominance as follows. Let 
0
ii SS =  for  all 
iN ∈ . Recursively, for every positive integer  1 k ≥ , let 
k
ii SS ⊂  denote the set of 
strategies  i s  for  agent iN ∈  such  that 
1 k
ii sS
− ∈ , and there exists no  ii sS ′∈  such  that 




− − ∈ . 









≡ ∩ . 
It is clear that if  ii SS
∞ =    for  all iN ∈ , then  S     is mutually undominated. 
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5. Main Theorem 
 
  The following theorem implies that the honest strategy profile 
* s  is the only 
strategy profile that is consistent with mutual dominance, and therefore, it is the unique 
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the game  (, ( ) ) iiN U ∈ Γ . 
 
Theorem 1: A subset of strategy profiles  SS ⊂    is mutually undominated in the game 
(, ( ) ) iiN U ∈ Γ   if and only if 
* {} ii Ss =    for  all i N ∈ . 
 
Proof: Suppose 
* {} ii Ss =    for all iN ∈ . Then, it is clear from Assumptions 1 and 2 
that  S    is mutually undominated; inequalities (2) and (3) imply that for every  iN ∈  
and every 
* \{ } iii sSs ∈ , 
** * * () () (/) (/) ii i i i i Vs Ws Vs s Ws s −> − , that is, 
** () (/) ii i Us Us s > . 
Suppose that 
* {} ii Ss ≠    for some iN ∈ . Then, there exist iN ∈  and  ii sS ∈    
such that 
() ii ts<∞, and 
() () ii j j ts ts ≤  for  all  j N ∈  and  all  jj sS ∈   . 
Let us fix  ii sS −− ∈     arbitrarily. Suppose that there exists  \{} jNi ∈  such  that 
() jj ts<∞, and 
() () jj h h ts ts ≤  for  all  \{, } hNi j ∈ .   20
Let us choose  0 ε >   close to zero. Then, from Assumption 1 and the definition of  i L , 
,( ) () (/ )








ii i t s
t
vg s t vg s t s t d r t ε +
=









ii i t s
tt s














vg m st vg m d r t
=










vg s t vg s t m d r t
ε +
=
+− − − ∫  
[exp{ ( )} exp( { ( ) })] ij j j j Lr t s r t s ε ≤−− −+ , 
which is approximated by  exp( ( )) ij j Lr rt s ε − . Moreover, from inequalities (4) in 
Assumption 3, 
,( ) ( ) ( / ) exp( ( ))
jj ii i t s i j j Ws Wss L r r ts ε ε + −> − . 
From these observations, we have shown that 
    ,( ) () (/ )
jj ii i t s Us Uss ε + −  
,( ) ,( ) () (/ ) { () (/ ) }
jj jj ii i t s i i i t s Vs Vss Ws Wss εε ++ =− − −  
    exp( ( )) exp( ( )) 0 ij j ij j Lr rt s Lr rt s ε ε <− −− = . 
  Next, suppose that 
() jj ts=∞ for  all  /{} j Ni ∈ , that is, 
*
ii ss − − = . 
Then, from inequalities (2) and (3),   21
   
** * () (/ ) () (/ ) () (/ ) ii i i i i ii i Us Uss Vs Vss Ws Wss −= − − + 
   
** (/ ) ( ) (/ ) ( ) 0 iii ii i Vss Vs Wss Ws =− −+ < . 
From the above arguments, we have proven that S    is not mutually undominated, 
which is a contradiction. 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Each agent feels guilty about announcing dishonestly if she/he expects that the 
other agents have never announced dishonestly. Hence, in order to reduce her/his 
psychological cost caused by guilt-aversion, she/he may prefer postponing the time to 
announce dishonestly until any other agent announces dishonestly in her/his expectation. 
However, there may exist the difficulty that when postponing her/his announcement, 
she/he may be caught between the reduction in her/his psychological cost and the loss in 
her/his material payoff, both of which are commonly caused by the changes of her/his 
messages from the dishonest ones to the honest ones. 
Assumption 3 does overcome this difficulty. Suppose that any agent can avoid 
being the first person to announce dishonestly by delaying her/his time for a very short 
interval. Note from Assumption 3 that the probability of the announcement procedure 
terminating during this short interval is kept small enough to make the expected value 
of the loss in her/his intrinsic utility less than the reduction in her/his psychological cost, 
both of which are commonly caused by her/his message changes during this short 
interval. Hence, the smallness of probabilities in this manner triggers the tail-chasing 
competition among the agents that edges their timing upward endlessly, eliminating 
unwanted strategies.       22
  With respect to the functioning of the tail-chasing competition, our model is related 
to the basic concept of the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism (Abreu and Matsushima 
(1992a, 1994)). In the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism, each agent announces multiple 
messages
8 and is motivated to avoid being one of the first persons who announce 
messages that are inconsistent with their first messages, triggering a tail-chasing 
competition amongst the agents. 
There exist many substantive points of difference between our model and the 
Abreu-Matsushima mechanism, and they are as follows. In order to trigger the 
tail-chasing competition, the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism uses any contractual 
device of side payments or similar to this, stipulating that any agent is fined by a small 
amount of money if and only if she/he is one of the first persons who announce 
messages that are inconsistent with their first messages. In contrast to the 
Abreu-Matsushima mechanism, our model never uses any such contractual device. The 
Abreu-Matsushima mechanism also needs additional devices that incentivize the agents 
to make honest first announcements, which are generally tailored for the details of the 
model specifications in complicated ways.
9 Because of the use of incentive devices in 
this manner, all the messages announced must be verifiable to the court in the 
Abreu-Matsushima mechanism. In contrast, our model does not require this verifiability 
except in the case of the agents’ final announcements, because we do not use any further 
contractual device contingent on their announcements.   
  It was assumed in our model that each agent cannot observe the other agents’ 
                                                 
8 In the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism, the number of messages that each agent actually 
announces is fixed; this number is uncertain in our model since the announcement procedure is 
randomly terminated. 
9Matsushima (2008a, 2008b) introduced psychological costs into the Abreu-Matsushima 
mechanism design in order to avoid this complexity.   23
announcements. If we permit each agent to observe them, then we must investigate a 
version of an infinitely repeated game and may struggle with the multiplicity of 
equilibria implied by the Folk Theorem or some similar principle.
10 In spite of this 
multiplicity, the above assumption is not very crucial for our main theorem. In fact, we 
can ease this multiplicity by setting the hazard rate sufficiently large. By doing this way, 
it is sure that the restriction implied by Assumption 3 becomes stronger. As Example 2 
expresses, however, irrespective of how to set the hazard rate, Assumption 3 holds 
automatically whenever the function  ( ) i Ws  of each agent  ' is   psychological payoff is 
discontinuous at the first time that she/he make a dishonest announcement earlier than 
any other agent. 
 
                                                 
10 With minor modifications added, the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism functions even if the 
agents’ announcements are observable; by regarding the last messages as the references and 
fining any final deviant, we can show that the permissive results hold irrespective of whether 
the agents’ announcements are observable or not. 
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6. Incomplete Information 
 
We can extend our model to the incomplete information case as follows. Before the 
announcement procedure is started, each agent iN ∈  receives her/his private signal 
denoted by  ii ω ∈Ω , where  i Ω  is the finite set of private signals for agent i. Let 
() iiN ω ω ∈ ≡   denote a private signal profile, and let  i iN ∈ Ω ≡×Ω  denote the set of private 
signal profiles. Conditionally on agent  ' is  private signal  ii ω ∈Ω , the probability that 
the other agents receive any profile of their private signals 









= ∑ . 
For every  iN ∈  and  every  ii ω ∈Ω , let us fix a message 
* i
ii mM
ω ∈   as the honest 
message for agent i   associated with her/his private signal  ii ω ∈Ω . Let 
* * ()
i
ii N mm M
ω ω
∈ =∈  denote the honest message profile associated with the private 
signal profile  ω∈Ω. Let us specify 
* i
ii sS








ω , agent i  announces the honest message 
* i
i m
ω  associated with 
her/his private signal  ii ω ∈Ω  at all times. Let 
* * ()
i
ii N ss S
ω ω





ω ∈ , we denote by  ()[ 0 ,)
i
ii ts
ω ∈ ∞  the first time at which agent  i 
announces any message that is different from the honest message 
* i
i m
ω  associated  with 
her/his private signal  i ω , where   25
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ω =  for  all  ()
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ω ∈ , we define 




i it i stm
ω
ω =    for  all  [0, ) tt ∈   , and 
,, () ()
i it i sts t ω =     for  all tt ≥   . 
According to  ,, i it s ω , agent i announces the honest message associated with her/his 
private signal  i ω  before  time t, whereas she/he follows  i s   at or after time  t. 
We define the payoff function for agent  i as  : i US R ×Ω→ , where 
(, ) (, ) (, ) ii i Us Vs Ws ω ωω =−. 
The first part  ( , ) i Vs ω  is called the material payoff associated with the private signal 
profile  ω∈Ω , and the second part  ( , ) i Ws ω  is called the psychological cost 
associated with the private signal profile ω∈Ω . The material payoff  ( , ) i Vs ω  is 
regarded as the expected value of the intrinsic utility  ( , ) i va R ω ∈   derived directly from 
the alternative choice when the private signal profile  ω∈Ω   takes place, that is, 
0
( , ) ( ( ( )), ) [1 exp( )] ii
t
Vs vgs t d r t ωω
∞
=
≡− − ∫ . 
We introduce the following assumption on  ( , ) i va ω   that corresponds to Assumption 1 , 
which implies Bayesian incentive compatibility in terms of intrinsic utilities derived 
directly from the alternative choices. 
 
Assumption 4: For every  iN ∈ , every  ii ω ∈Ω , and every  ii mM ∈ ,   26
(5)    
** (( ) ,) ( | ) (( / ) ,) ( | )
ii ii
ii i i i i i i i vg m p vg m m p
ωω
ωω






  Assumption 4 implies that each agent can maximize the expected value of her/his 
intrinsic utility derived directly from the alternative choice conditional on her/his 
private signal by announcing honestly, provided the other agents announce honestly. 
We introduce the following two assumptions on  ( , ) i Ws ω , that is, Assumptions 5 
and 6, which correspond to Assumptions 2 and 3, respectively. 
 
Assumption 5: For every  iN ∈  and  every ω∈Ω , 
(6)    
** (, ) (/ , ) ii i Ws Ws s




ω ∈ . 
 
Assumption 6: For every  iN ∈ , every  \{ } j Ni ∈ , every  ω∈Ω , and every  sS ∈ , if 
    ( )
j
jj ts
ω <∞, and 
() () ()
j ih
ii jj hh ts ts ts
ω ωω ≤≤ for  all  \{ , } hNi j ∈ , 
then 
(7)    
,, ()
0
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where we redefine 
2 (,,)
max | ( , ) ( , ) | ii i
aa A




′ ≡− . 
 
Assumption 5 implies that whenever each agent expects the other agents to 
announce honestly at all times, then she/he can save her/his psychological cost by 
announcing honestly at all times. Assumption 6 implies that each agent can save her/his   27
psychological cost by waiting for any other agent to announce dishonestly earlier than 
she/he. 
We shall introduce an additional assumption on  ( , ) i Ws ω  as  follows. 
 
Assumption 7: For every  iN ∈ , every  ω∈Ω , every  sS ∈ , and every  ()
i
ii tts
ω > , 
(8)     ,, (, ) (/ , )
i ii i t Ws Wss ω ω ω > . 
 
Assumption 7 implies that each agent can save her/his psychological cost by 
postponing the first time to announce dishonestly, irrespective of whether the other 
agents announce honestly. It is implicit in Assumptions 5, 6, and 7 that the degree to 
which each agent  i  can save her/his psychological cost is very limited. 
In the incomplete information case, a strategy for agent  i  is redefined as 
:[0, ) ii i M σ ∞× Ω→ , 
where ( , ) ii i tM σ ω ∈  implies the message that agent i announces at time t when 
her/his private signal is given by  ii ω ∈Ω . We assume that  ( , ) ii t σ ω  is 
right-continuous with respect to  [0, ) t∈ ∞ . Let  i Σ   denote the set of strategies for agent 
i. Let  i iN ∈ Σ≡ ×Σ  denote the set of strategy profiles. In the incomplete information case, 
the honest strategy for agent  i  is denoted by 
*




ω σω ⋅= for  all  ii ω ∈Ω . 
The expected payoff for agent  i when she/he receives the private signal  ii ω ∈Ω  
is defined as 
(, ) ( ,)( | )
ii
ii i i i EU U s p
ω




≡ ∑ .   28
We define a Bayesian game as ( ,( ) ) iiN EU ∈ Γ . We denote by  ii Σ ⊂Σ    a subset of 
strategies for agent  i. Let  i iN ∈ Σ≡ ×Σ ⊂Σ   . We shall confine our attention to any subset 
of strategy profiles  Σ     satisfying that either 
* {} ii σ Σ=    for  all iN ∈ , 
or there exist  iN ∈ ,  ii σ ∈Σ   , and  ii ω ∈Ω  such  that 
(( ,) ) (( , ) )
j i
ii i i j j j tt
ω ω σ ωσ ω ⋅≤ ⋅ for  all  j N ∈ , all  jj σ ∈Σ   , and  jj ω ∈Ω . 
A subset of strategy profiles  Σ⊂Σ    is said to be Bayesian mutually undominated in 
(, ( ) ) iiN EU ∈ Γ   if there exist no  iN ∈ ,  ii σ ∈Σ   ,  ii σ′∈Σ , and  ii ω ∈Ω  such  that 
(/,) (,) ii i i i EU EU σ σω σ ω ′ >  for  all  ii σ− − ∈Σ   . 
We can regard Bayesian mutual dominance as a generalized concept of Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium, and can relate Bayesian mutual dominance to iterative dominance in the 
incomplete information case, in the same way as in Section 4. The following theorem 
corresponds to Theorem 1; the honest strategy profile 
* σ  is the only strategy profile 
that is consistent with Bayesian mutual dominance. 
 
Theorem 2: A subset  Σ⊂Σ    is Bayesian mutually undominated in the Bayesian game 
(, ( ) ) iiN EU ∈ Γ   if and only if 
* {} ii σ Σ=    for  all iN ∈ . 
 
Proof: Suppose 
* {} ii σ Σ=    for all iN ∈ . Then, from Assumptions 4 and 5, it follows 
that for every  iN ∈ , every  ii ω ∈Ω , and every 
* \{ } ii i S σ σ ∈ ,   29
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which imply   
** (,) (/,) ii i i i EU EU σ ωσ σ ω −  
** (, ) ( |) (, ) ( |)
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ωω
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ωω
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−⋅ + ⋅ ∑∑  
0 > . 
Hence,  Σ     is Bayesian mutually undominated. 
Suppose that 
* {} ii σ Σ≠    for some iN ∈ . Then, there exist iN ∈ ,  ii σ ∈Σ   , and 




ω σω ⋅< ∞ , and 
(( ,) ) (( , ) )
j i
iii jj j tt
ω ω σ ωσ ω ⋅≤ ⋅ for  all  j N ∈ , all  jj σ ∈Σ   , and all 
jj ω ∈Ω . 
Fix  ii σ−− ∈Σ    and  ii ω−− ∈Ω  arbitrarily. Let us choose  0 ε >  close to zero. Suppose 
that there exists  /{} j Ni ∈  such  that 
(( ,) ) (( , ) )
j i
iii jj j tt
ω ω σ ωσ ω ⋅= ⋅. 
Then, from the definition of  i L , it follows 
,, () (( ,) ,) (( ,) / ( , ) ,)
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ω σωω σω ω
+
=
=− − − ∫ ,   30
[exp{ ( (, ))} exp( { ( (, )) })]
jj
ij j j j j j Lr t r t
ωω σ ωσ ω ε ≤−⋅ − − ⋅ + , 
which is approximated by  exp( ( (, )))
j
ij j j Lr rt
ω εσ ω −⋅ . Since  0 ε >  is close to zero, it 
follows from Assumption 6 that 
,, () (( ,) ,) (( ,) / ( , ) ,)
ii i ii i t s i WW ωε σ ωω σ ω σ ω ω + ⋅− ⋅ ⋅ . 
exp( ( (, )))
j
ij j j Lr rt
ω εσ ω >− ⋅ . 
From these inequalities, we have proven that 
,, () (( ,) ,) (( ,) / ( , ) ,)
ii i ii i t s i UU ωε σ ωω σ ω σ ω ω + ⋅− ⋅ ⋅  
,, () (( ,) ,) (( ,) / ( , ) ,)
ii i ii i t s i VV ωε σ ωω σ ω σ ω ω + =⋅ −⋅ ⋅  
,, () (( ,) ,) (( ,) / ( , ) ,)
ii i ii i t s i WW ωε σ ωω σ ω σ ω ω + −⋅ +⋅ ⋅  
exp( ( (, ))) exp( ( ( , )))
jj
ij j j ij j j Lr rt Lr rt
ωω εσ ω εσ ω <− ⋅ −− ⋅ 0 = . 
Next, suppose that there exists  /{} j Ni ∈  such  that 
    ( ( , ) ) ( ( , ) )
j i
iii jj j tt
ω ω σ ωσ ω ⋅< ⋅, and 
(( ,) ) (( ,) )
j i
jjj iii tt
ω ω σ ωσ ω
′
′′′ ⋅≤ ⋅ for  all  \{ , } iNi j ′∈ . 
Then, by letting  0 ε >  be less than  ( (, )) ( (, )) 0
j i
jjj iii tt
ω ω σω σω ⋅ −⋅ > , it follows from 
Assumption 4 that 
,, () (( ,) ,) (( ,) / ( , ) ,)















=− − − ∫ 0 ≤ . 
Assumption 7 implies 
,, () (( ,) ,) (( ,) / ( , ) ,) 0
ii i ii i t s i WW ωε σ ωω σ ω σ ω ω + ⋅− ⋅ ⋅ > .   31
From these inequalities, it follows that 
,, () (( ,) ,) (( ,) / ( , ) ,)
ii i ii i t s i UU ωε σ ωω σ ω σ ω ω + ⋅− ⋅ ⋅  
,, () (( ,) ,) (( ,) / ( , ) ,)
ii i ii i t s i VV ωε σ ωω σ ω σ ω ω + =⋅ −⋅ ⋅  
,, () (( ,) ,) (( ,) / ( , ) ,)0
ii i ii i t s i WW ωε σ ωω σ ω σ ω ω + −⋅ +⋅ ⋅ < . 
From the above observations, by letting  0 ε >   get close to zero, we have proven that 
(/,) (,) ii i i i EU EU σ σω σ ω ′ >  for  all  ii σ− − ∈Σ   , 
where  ii σ′∈Σ  is  specified  by  ,, () (, ) (, )
ii i ii i t s i ωε σ ωσ ω + ′ ⋅ =⋅  for  all  ii ω ∈Ω . This, 
however, contradicts the supposition of  ii σ ∈Σ   . 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Let us define a function  : f A Ω →  by 
   
* () ( ) fg m
ω ω =  for  all ω∈Ω , 
which corresponds to the concept of social choice function in the standard theory of 
implementation. Theorem 2 implies that the social choice function  f  is  implementable 
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, that is, 
* σ  is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium, 
and 
* (() ) () gs f ω ω =  for  all ω∈Ω . 
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